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bund, money stock targets -their legitimacy and necessity scientifically attested -became the vehicles of discipline.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve began formulating its policies in these terms in I970. The monetary oversight Committees in both Houses of Congress, influenced by monetarist staff, insisted on targets for monetary aggregates. These Committees examine the 'Fed' Chairman quarterly and grade him on his marksmanship. Elsewhere in the Capitol other Committees struggle, along with the President's agents, with the budget. The operations are What have been the results of the monetarist turn in U.S. demand-management policies? Following the reduced-form methodology to which Johnson alluded, we may seek proof of the pudding in the eating. As we all know, real outcomes have been less satisfactory on average than in the two previous decades and less stable than in the I96os. Inflation has accelerated and its variance has risen too. After a decade without recession, we have suffered three in the last ten years, including the one now in progress. The two most recent recessions are the most severe of post-war history. All three recessions were deliberate acts of policy, especially monetary policy. As Table I indicates, there was somewhat greater stability in monetary growth rates in the I97os, but considerably less stability in the macro variables of real importance. The decade of activist policy, the I96os, looks better than the years before or after. ' Monetarists complain, of course, that the players on the field did not faithfully follow their coaches' game plan. True enough, and quite normal. Neither did Lyndon Johnson follow his 'Keynesian' coaches' game plan when he escalated the Vietnam war without raising taxes in I 966, but the 'New Economics' of the period has not thereby escaped blame for the resulting inflation. The Federal Reserve has not been wholly monetarist since the I 970 conversion. The 'Fed' moved its short-run money growth targets with eyes on national and international economic variables, actual and projected, and did not completely abandon its old strategy of 'leaning against the wind' but not too hard.
The 'Fed's' imperfect marksmanship did not prevent strong swings in demands for money and credit from showing up in money supplies. Sometimes these were 'IS' shocks whose accommodation intensified boom or recession. Sometimes they were 'LM'shocks that, according to William Poole's paradigm2, should be accommodated. By the same principles, the Fed's corrective responses to errors of marksmanship were sometimes stabilising and sometimes not. Lacking any levers at its operations desk marked M1 or M2, the 'Fed' has to control these quantities indirectly, by reference to a related variable it can control. Until recently, this was the market interest rate on overnight interbank loans, 'Federal Funds'. Every month, sometimes more frequently, the Federal Open Market Committee reconsidered its Funds rate target and moved it up or down as thought necessary to return money stocks to the desired track or keep them there.
Monetarists criticised this procedure -pegging nominal interest rates! -for allowing excessive swings in money supplies. The Federal Open Market Committee, the critics said, adjusted the instrumental Funds rate target too little and too late. In October I979 the Fed surrendered, announcing that henceforth its week-to-week operations would be guided by quantitative targets for bank reserves, subject to broad and adjustable interest rate limits. Unfortunately the short run relation of Ms and MVs to reserve stocks is, as subsequent events illustrate, no tighter than their relation to the Federal Funds rate.
More basic practical difficulties of single-minded monetarism were exemplified in the summer of I 980 by the dilemma of the American central bank. Demand for new bank credit had dwindled, and for the time being the'Fed's' moneygrowth targets seemed unattainable without short-term rates so low compared to those In principle monetarism provides no support for the traditional and everpopular conservative warning that deficit spending is inflationary. Monetarist doctrine says that deficits increase aggregate nominal spending only as they lead to increases of money supply. In countries with underdeveloped financial systems, printing money may be the only feasible way to finance deficits. But in countries like the United States and United Kingdom, any linkage must be political choice rather than technical necessity. The allegation that political pressure forces the central bank to monetise deficits has dubious empirical foundation, especially in recent years. Some non-causal correlation between base money growth and deficits will be observed when both move countercyclically, money for policy reasons, deficits endogenously.
Monetarists frequently charge deficit spending with 'crowding out' productive private investment. Popular versions of this charge are particularly disingenuous in failing to distinguish cases in which real output is supplyconstrained from those in which it is merely money-constrained. In the former cases, any new draft on resources, however financed, is bound to crowd out other uses. Allocational priorities are an important consideration in the mix of monetary and fiscal policies, but judgement about them is not a specifically monetarist issue. In cases of the second kind, to crowd out or not to crowd out is a choice of monetary policy. With employable resources available, deficitfinanced demands could be accommodated by money supply to the degree they are not naturally accommodated by velocity.
Professional debate on the macro-economic efficacies of fiscal and monetary policies contains, after all, little ideological excitement. First principles of free enterprise do not say which will be the more effective or useful or hazardous. Both public finance and monetary management are embarrassing exceptions to the ideological rule that competitive pursuit of private interests will handle all society's economic problems. For just that reason many conservatives find the unmanaged gold standard more congenial than the controlled fiat money of the monetarists.
Monetarism is more in tune with the wider ideology in its insistence on stability in macro-economic policy. Activist demand management, 'fine tuning' compensatory counter-cyclical policies -monetarists identify these as the sources of instability in overall economic performance. With stable policies, they say, the economy itself will be stable. Exogenous non-policy shocks, including entrepreneurial expectations and spirits, are assigned comparatively little empirical importance. To those shocks that do occur market adjustments are swift and convergent. Policy variations are more likely to amplify than to dampen natural fluctuations, misallocating resources in the process. This is a more fundamental theme than the technical sovereignty of any monetary aggregate and it is more congenial to free enterprise ideology. It is also the theme of the second wave of the monetarist counter-revolution, the new classical macro-economics. The new doctrine has given a theroetical rationale for propositions that were previously matters of faith and empirical judgement. The grasp of the Invisible Hand is extended beyond micro-economic resource allocation to macro-economic optimality -market competition produces not just a tendency towards long-run optima but a continuous sequence of equilibria. Friedman himself is the link between the old monetarism and the new. The I968 message of his 'natural rate of unemployment'2 was that demand management policies can only temporarily alter real economic outcomes, that under stable policies the economy will reach equilibrium employment on its own.
Nevertheless I doubt that the new wave will establish a permanent place for monetarism in conservative ideology. The popular success of monetarism arose along with Inflation, the Evil that could be plausibly blamed on the errors and excesses of the reigning orthodoxy, the Evil for which monetarist rules of policy were the specific remedy. As ideology monetarism profited from the substantial real disappointments of the decade, notably OPEC shocks, because the public identified all personal, national, and worldwide reverses of economic fortune in the I970S as ravages of Inflation. Professional economists of all schools know that such disappointments and reverses could not be avoided by less accommodative monetary policies, any more than their firstorder costs could be escaped by more accommodative policies. Printing money does not produce oil, and neither does not printing it.
There has always been tension between ideological monetarism, which promises to rescue us from Inflation, and theoretical monetarism, which says that Inflation has little or no effect on the real performance of the economy. The tension is accentuated in monetarism mark ii, which relies heavily on the neutrality of money, even on super-neutrality, and applies the 'classical dichotomy' to continuously moving equilibrium. The message of the new classical macro-economics is not so much that Keynesian policies do Evil as that they do Nothing. Not quite: an alleged evil is that capricious shifts in policy rules confuse private agents and cause allocational distortions. Whatever its intrinsic merit, this point is not the stuff of ideology; its lay appeal is as limited as that of the 'shoe-leather' costs of economising cash during anticipated inflations.
The tension is likely in time to become a telling weakness in monetarism as conservative ideology, if only because it attenuates the evangelical fervour of leading new classical theorists. In the face of monetarism ii, some more oldfashioned conservative economists steadfastly maintain that deficits, debt, easy money, and inflation do serious positive harm.
Both wings can agree on macro-economic policies. It is therefore likely that THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH the public focus of conservative political economy will shift away from macro concerns to the size of government, regulation, progressive taxation, the welfare state, and related 'supply-side' issues. Government is a currently popular Evil, and probably an easier target than Inflation. The salient proposition underlying this approach is that labour and product markets in the dominant 'fixprice' sectors are in disequilibrium most of the time. That is, they are characterised by excess supply or demand at existing wages and prices. A large share of short-run adjustment occurs via quantities rather than prices. Wages and prices are insufficiently flexible to keep markets continuously cleared.
III MONETARISM
The adjustment process itself has not, in general, been successfully described as optimising behaviour, the only paradigm that carries theoretical conviction in our profession. This failure, neither surprising nor discreditable in view of the intrinsic difficulties of the task, is the root of the chronic crisis in macro-economics.
Monetarism II has not solved this problem, but has evaded it. The new classical macro-economists,1 bolder than their pre-Keynesian forebears, just assume that product and labour markets are continuously in supply-demand equilibrium. They know and admit, of course, that this is not literally true. But the 'methodology of positive economics' protects them from empirical examination of their premises: let's see, they say in effect, if macroeconomic observations behave 'as if' generated by price-cleared markets.
They further assume, of course, that participants in those markets make future-oriented decisions on the basis of rational expectations of relevant variables, including government policies. The substantive thrust of this important assumption is to eliminate the inertia that adaptive expectations imparted to earlier models of wage and price adjustments. The implication is that real outcomes will be invariant to anticipated monetary policies, as indeed to any events that do not change real endowments, current and expected.
By to the basic assumptions of market-clearing and rational expectations, an arbitrary and empirically far-fetched specification of imperfections and asymmetries in the information available to various economic agents, for example sellers and buyers.
Second, the theory fails to account for many observed regularities of cyclical fluctuations. I do not have time to catalogue them here. My dear friend Arthur Okun, in a paper I heard him give only a couple of weeks before his tragic death, gave a thorough and admirable list'. These phenomena are quite consistent with the modern Keynesian view, and indeed the old monetarist view as well, that unemployment and idle capacity reflect excess supply in non-cleared markets. They are not consistent with the new classical view.
Inertia of wage and price paths could be attributed either to sluggishness in adaptation of expectations or to institutional rigidities. The rational expectations revolution, discrediting adaptive expectations, has focused the profession's attention on the second source of inertia. Contracts, explicit and implicit, are an obvious institutional rigidity. They are particularly important in United States labour relations, where collective bargaining contracts are made for as long as three years. Workers' concern for relative status is, as Keynes argued, another important factor, again especially in the United States, where collective bargaining is both decentralised and unsynchronised in time. Since contracts do not cover all contingencies, as they would if made by Arrow and Debreu, it is possible for compensatory policies following well-understood rules to be effective for good or ill by responding to macro-economic information that becomes available during the tenure of contracts.
The big policy debate today, certainly in our two countries, concerns the effectiveness and the side effects of a sustained and determined programme of monetary disinflation.2 Will such a programme succeed in eliminating or significantly reducing our current inflations, and if so how fast? How much damage to real economic variables, employment, output, and investment, will occur in the process? How rapidly will local prices adjust downward if the monetary authorities resolutely refuse to accommodate OPEC boosts and other specific price shocks? Past experience, including the previous recession and the current one, yields pessimistic answers. In the United States, up to go % of reductions in monetary spending for a year goes into output rather than prices. Two or three pointyears of extra unemployment bring down the inertial core inflation by only one point.
Monetarists contend that the observations that generated these unpromising estimates of short-run trade-offs were coloured by the expectations of private agents -workers, unions, managements -that compensatory policies would relieve them of the necessity to lower money wages and prices to restore normal employment and sales volumes. Consequently, they contend, disin-flation will occur much more rapidly, and with much less real transitional damage, if the determination of the authorities to 'stay the course' this time is well advertised and well understood.' This is a highly speculative prospect to bet on. Can such a threat really be credible in a democracy, where governments cannot bind their successors? Perhaps the chances of policy reversal are, and will be perceived to be, less in a Parliamentary system like your own than in our Congressional-Presidential structure. Even if the threat is credible, how will it be read by individual workers, unions, and enterprises? Each group might well prefer to let the rest of the economy do the disinflating, thus making sure that its relative status is protected whatever the other groups do. Unfortunately, monetarist propaganda has undermined the monetarist programme, by spreading the notions that inflation is wholly the responsibility of government and that disinflation can be achieved solely and costlessly by governmental financial reform while private agents conduct business as usual.
The main point is that the experiment is novel, the subjects are national and world economies, and the stakes are very high. For this reason, I personally think it would be only prudent to coordinate monetary disinflation with an incomes policy designed to disinflate nominal income claims at a pace consistent with the deceleration of aggregate monetary demand. A coordinated programme would combine threat with promise -promise that jobs and sales will be maintained and promise that no union or other interest will be going it alone. Given mutual consistency of the policies, wage/price controls would not be trying to hold the lid on a kettle boiling with excess demand. At the end of several transitional years, the inflationary legacy of existing contracts and status comparisons would have been overcome. Both expectations and policies would then support the continuation of less inflationary patterns without controls.
A coordinated programme of this kind presumes that the society enjoys or can reach rough basic consensus on division of the social product. If there is irreconcilable conflict, the society's maladies are deeper than their inflationary symptoms and certainly beyond the reach of any central bank. And it is gratuitously optimistic to think that fundamental distributional conflict can be resolved by shrinking the pie over which the parties are contesting.
Monetarists, of course, fervently oppose controls of any kind, even flexible varieties based on tax penalities or rewards or on the negotiable ration tickets devised by the ever-inventive Abba Lerner.2 Monetarists commonly say that incomes policies are not sufficient, which is true; they must be accompanied by suitably disinflationary demand management. They commonly say that they were not necessary, which is a highly debatable assertion of faith. They always say they are allocationally inefficient, which is true as far as it goes. But these inefficiencies must be compared with the real costs of recession and stagflation 
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empirically implausible, rationale for monetarist dismissals of the macroeconomic importance of fiscal policies. (At the same time, however, it exonerates government borrowing of the charge of crowding out private investment.) On the empirical front, Lucas's critique of econometric policy evaluation' has called existing structural models into question, on the ground that their behavioural equations will not be invariant to policy rules and regimes. Given the hazards of a priori classification of variables as exogenous or endogenous, Sims and others seek to infer causation from nonstructural systems.2 So the pseudo-reduced-form empiricism of Monetarism I seems less illegitimate now than it did ten years ago. In any event, the question whether money causes income or income money or both is still undecided. In some respects the new monetarism is as vulnerable to Johnson's objection as the old. Popular rational expectations macro-models, from which strong propositions about policy are derived, are underdeveloped on the financial side. They too neglect to describe the monetary transmission process. They assume a single sovereign M, unspecified as to concept, properties, and measure. They assume it to be directly controllable by the authorities; they do not explicitly relate it to instruments of monetary control, government budgets, or financial institutions and markets. They assume neutralities that would not survive in richer models, which would take account of such phenomena as rigidities of nominal, interest rates on currency, deposits, and central bank discounts and as the different wealth and portfolio effects of monetisation of government deficits, central bank open-market operations, credit creation by financial intermediaries, and other money-supply processes. A related monetarist oversimplification is the common two-way classification of shocks as monetary or real, ignoring the monetary-real combination in a shock, for example, to the marginal efficiency of capital. These deficiencies are remediable as the new monetarism drops the primitive dogmas of the old, but as Johnson said, the process will involve some loss of distinctive identity.
The synthesis of revolution and counter-revolution that Harry Johnson expected in I970 has not yet occurred. Instead the gulf has widened, as the advent of Monetarism II prolonged the life of the counter-revolution. I think nonetheless that the synthetic phase of the dialectic is beginning. The synthesis will not be, to the extent that Johnson predicted, the disappearance of monetarism into an eclectic neoclassical neo-Keynesian mainstream. The ideas of the second counter-revolution are too distinctive and too powerful to be lost in the shuffle. They are bound to shape whatever orthodoxy emerges. The durable ideas are more methodological than substantive -internally consistent derivation of rational expectations and rational behaviour, embodied in the structural equations of a general equilibrium macro-economic model. These ideas are already being mobilised not just to exalt the Invisible Hand but to explain the
